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Multinationals and Domestic TFP: Market Shares, 
Agglomerations Gains and Foreign Ownership 
 
Abstract 
We revisit the puzzle regarding the role of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) on Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) of domestic firms by drawing attention to foreign ownership structure. First, 
we differentiate between market share (MS) due to competition effects and knowledge 
agglomeration gains (AG). The former induces market pressure, due to foreign presence, and 
makes domestic firms to charge lower price mark-ups. Second, we investigate whether intra-
industry (horizontal) and inter-industry (vertical) spillovers vary with the degree of foreign 
control. Using a sample of manufacturing firms from six European countries, we find that 
higher presence of MNEs in the domestic market makes domestic firms to charge lower mark-
ups. Only majority and wholly-owned MNEs generate statistically significant horizontal 
spillovers. The economic size of these spillovers is low. We also detect backward spillovers 
from MNEs in downstream industries. However, forward spillovers from MNEs in upstream 
industries are negative. When we control for absorptive capacity, direct linkages with MNEs, 
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The empirical literature that examines the impact of multinational enterprises (MNEs hereafter) 
on productivity performance of domestic firms provides mixed and contradictory results. Early 
evidence from developing countries offers mainly negative results (Aitken and Harrison, 1999; 
Djankov and Hoekman, 2000; Konnings, 2001). With regard to developed countries, Haskel et 
al.,(2007) and Keller and Yeaple (2009) report gains from FDI spillovers in UK and US 
domestic firms, respectively. However, they consider only intra-industry measures of FDI 
presence1 and neglect the possibility that knowledge spillovers can also be derived from inter-
industry linkages between domestic firms and MNEs as in Javorcik (2004). The main 
conclusion from the existing FDI spillovers literature is that the impact of MNEs on 
performance of domestic firms is not straightforward and one should carefully consider the 
various channels through which MNEs influence economic activity of host and particularly 
developed countries (Greenaway, 2004; Crespo and Fontoura, 2007; Hayakawa et al.,(2012); 
Bournakis et al, 2019).   
In this paper, we undertake this challenge and revisit the puzzle about the role of MNEs 
spillovers on domestic firms’ productivity. We use firm level data from six European countries. 
The first key objective of the paper is to differentiate between structural competition effects 
and pure knowledge agglomeration gains, as these two are not usually explored separately 
leading to a misinterpretation of the true knowledge transfer effect associated with the presence 
of MNEs. 
 Competition effects are associated with the size of MNEs’ and their tendency to exploit 
economies of scale. Domestic firms may lose market shares due to MNEs presence 
encountering a market-stealing effect (Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Alfaro and Chen, 2013). The 
loss of market share induces competition pressure that forces domestic firms to charge a lower 
price mark-up. Reallocation of market shares within the domestic market emerges from the 
presence of MNEs and it is classified as a market share (MS) effect. The MS effect is expected 
to be more severe for domestic firms that compete directly with MNEs subsidiaries within 
narrowly defined industries (Blomström et al., 2003; Alfaro and Chen, 2013).  
MNEs also generate agglomeration gains (AG) in the form of knowledge spillovers (i.e. 
better technological know-how, enlargement of the labour pooling, advanced organisational 
and managerial expertise, etc.) (Poole, 2013; Bloom et al., 2013). AG impact directly on 
productivity of domestic firms and take place in various forms. First, we have horizontal 
                                                          
1 MNEs that operate within the same industry. 
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spillovers that derive from MNEs, which operate within the same industry. Second, we have 
vertical spillovers from inter-industry supplier transactions that take the form of either forward 
spillovers from upstream industries or backward spillovers from downstream industries 
(Javorcik, 2004; Perri et al., 2013; Newman et al., 2015). The existence of horizontal spillovers 
remains a matter of empirical scrutiny with recent meta-analysis (Havranek and Irsova, 2013) 
establishing a zero effect on productivity. Indeed, the potential of horizontal spillovers depends 
on the ownership structure of MNEs as the latter determines the scope and the opportunities 
for knowledge transfer from foreign to domestic firms.2 With regard to vertical spillovers, the 
existing evidence suggests positive backward spillovers (Rojec and Knell, 2018; Javorcik and 
Spatareanu, 2011). However, empirical findings as regards the size of forward spillovers is less 
clear with their effect to be economically negligible or even negative (Havranek and Irsova, 
2011). 
Our paper offers three main novelties. First, we provide new insights on the debate of 
FDI spillovers by distinguishing the MS effect from AG. Within our methodological 
framework, we identify how price mark-ups of domestic firms are driven by the presence of 
MNEs. Higher output shares of MNEs within the same industry are expected to decrease 
market power of domestic rivals, which is reflected into lower price mark-ups. The MS effect 
represents essentially a favourable competition effect with important welfare implications for 
consumers of the recipient economy. In identifying knowledge AG, we isolate pricing effects 
from technology, so increases in the productivity of domestic firms’ capture only technical 
improvements that can be attributed to gains from knowledge spillovers.  
Second, we propose a novel FDI spillover index to capture AG on domestic productivity. 
Earlier studies measure the presence of MNEs in the domestic market with the share of total 
inward FDI to industry’s total output.3 Recently, Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008), Keller and 
Yeaple, (2009), Lu et al., (2017) and Fons-Rosen et al., (2017) measure spillover indices by 
using the sum of weighted output of foreign firms as share of total output in the industry. 
Although gross output or sales revenue capture the presence of MNEs in the domestic market, 
they do not provide information as regards the evolution of technological progress in MNEs. 
The main source of knowledge spillovers is the technological superiority of MNEs, which is 
not necessarily embodied in a pure weighted measure of gross output. Therefore, we create 
                                                          
2 Evidence in favour of horizontal spillovers is found in Blomström and Kokko (1998); Bwalya (2006); Javorcik 
and Spatareanu (2008); Blalock and Gertler (2009); Abraham et al. (2010). Nonetheless, all these studies highlight 
that the size of horizontal spillovers is conditional on the degree of absorptive capacity of domestic firms. 
3 See for example Liu et al. (2000); Girma (2005); Driffield and Love (2007). 
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FDI-related spillovers adjusted for Total Factor Productivity (TFP) of MNEs. TFP is the closest 
approximation of technical change (Stiroh, 2001; Link and Siegel, 2003)4, thus conceptually 
represents more accurately how the evolution of TFP in MNEs induces gains for domestic 
firms in the form of horizontal or vertical spillovers.   
Third, following a recent line of research by McCaughey et al. (2018) this paper links the 
existence of knowledge spillovers to the degree of foreign ownership in MNEs. The ownership 
status is central in identifying horizontal spillovers as it determines the scope and the incentives 
for transferring knowledge and intangible assets from the MNE parent to its subsidiary. The 
commonly used definition of 10% (or above) foreign ownership (IMF, 1993; 2009) does not 
necessarily capture all possible scenarios about the position of a foreign affiliate within the 
MNE group (Ramstetter and Ngoc, 2013; Chang et al., 2013; Papanastassiou et al., 2019). We 
argue that definitions of foreignness that are restricted only to higher thresholds might be more 
influential for the existence of knowledge spillovers. The way that the degree of foreign 
ownership works for knowledge spillovers is not always straightforward. In theory, a scheme 
of minor foreign ownership with the participation of a local shareholder makes the adoption of 
foreign technology easier (Blomström and Sjöholm, 1999).5 In a shared partnership MNEs’ 
managers are less restrictive in preventing technology leakages, so technology diffusion from 
foreign firms to local partners can be more easily implemented (Inkpen, 2000). The local 
partner can then use the technology acquired from the MNE into projects not involving the 
participation of the foreign firm, thus spreading the advanced technology more easily in the 
domestic market. In the case of a majority or a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary, access to the 
technology from domestic firms seems to be more difficult. However, knowledge transfer can 
still take place as a response to pressures triggered by the “liability of foreignness” (Zaheer, 
2015). The latter term refers to the occurrence of additional sunk costs for establishing 
networks in the host market, non-existent for domestic firms. Overcoming the burden of these 
costs requires the transfer of firm-specific advantages from the parent to the affiliate with the 
former to maintain the rights on how these assets will be used (McGaughey et al., 2018). In 
other words, MNEs will more likely transfer technologically sophisticated assets to their 
affiliates if their share of ownership safeguards a tighter control over these assets (Guadalupe 
et al., 2012; McGaughey et al., 2018).  Nonetheless, as contracts are inevitably incomplete, 
                                                          
4  TFP measures are derived from a production function framework, which measures directly the degree of 
efficiency in the process of transferring inputs into output (Link and Siegel, 2003). 
5  Other studies supporting the argument that technology diffusion is more easily implemented in a shared 
partnership mode can be found in Malerba and Torrisi (1992) and Castellani and Zanfei (2002).  
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productivity spillovers towards domestic firms are still possible even from fully owned foreign 
affiliates (Hart, 2017). Another aspect that increases the likelihood of knowledge diffusion 
from MNE affiliates that operate under increased foreign ownership is the de-motivation of 
managers in safeguarding firm-specific proprietary assets as all key decisions related to the 
operation of the subsidiary are delegated to the headquarters (Foss et al., 2012).6 With these 
considerations in mind, one might expect that majority or fully owned foreign affiliates can 
also generate substantial knowledge spillovers that might be potentially larger than those 
derived from MNEs with a looser definition of foreignness.   
To examine how the size of spillovers varies across definitions of foreign ownership, we 
use data of foreign ownership from the European Firms in the Global Economy (EFIGE) 
dataset to define: (a) a minor threshold (10-49%) of foreign ownership; (b) a majority threshold 
(50-99%) of foreign ownership; (c) a full (100%) foreign ownership. Our main goal is to 
identify whether the ownership structure of the foreign firm is central in exerting spillovers to 
domestic firms. Our definition of what is a foreign firm differs from the standard approach in 
the literature that applies a unified single threshold definition of foreign ownership throughout 
the analysis. Chang and Xu (2008) use a 25% threshold of equity to define a firm as foreign, 
Zhang et al. (2010) consider a 100% threshold of foreign equity. However, there is no evidence 
on how spillovers vary across alternative definitions within the same analytical framework. 7 
In our context, we produce results for MS effects and AG considering each time a different 
definition of foreignness.   
Using a sample of manufacturing firms from six EU countries, we find that increased 
competition resulting from MNEs presence forces domestic firms to charge a lower price mark-
up. We detect horizontal spillovers only from wholly owned foreign MNEs and to a lesser 
extent from majority owned MNEs. Horizontal spillovers become economically significant 
only if we take into account the absorptive capacity of domestic firms measured by intangible 
capital. Geographical proximity between domestic and foreign firms is also a factor that 
increases the potential of horizontal spillovers. Vertical spillovers in general seem are 
independent from foreign ownership structure. Backward spillovers from MNEs in 
downstream industries are positive, while forward spillovers from upstream industries are 
                                                          
6 Full foreign ownership of the MNE affiliate refers not only to the control of assets but also to the rights on the 
use of the residual income generated from these assets. This ownership mode creates an interventional hazard 
through a standard principal-agent problem which results in unintended diffusion of technology due to lack of 
incentives in the foreign affiliate (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart,1995).   
7 To the best of our knowledge, only McCaughey et al. (2018) evaluate the size of horizontal spillovers considering 
within the same analysis alternative definitions of foreignness based on the degree of foreign participation in the 
MNE subsidiary. Our study extends this approach evaluating knowledge gains from all possible spillovers.  
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initially negative. Once we control for direct linkages with MNEs in upstream sectors and the 
use of customised inputs, positive forward spillovers are also found. To mitigate issues related 
to endogeneity and reverse causality, we follow a difference in differences econometric 
approach, which verifies that the pattern of MNEs related spillovers found in the baseline 
econometric specifications are consistent.  
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 discusses data and measurement issues. It 
also elaborates on the creation of TFP spillover indices that measure the effects from MNEs 
presence. Section 3 provides the econometric specifications of the paper. It also provides 
baseline results as well as estimates from specifications that account for absorptive capacity, 
firm characteristics and geographical proximity. Section 4 shows the robustness analysis with 
a difference in differences identification strategy to control for endogeneity bias and other 
possible unobserved measurement errors. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Data and Measurement Issues 
2.1 Data Coverage: A Brief Description of the EFIGE Dataset  
 
The data provider of EFIGE is Bruegel, a Belgian non-profit international association 
that collects survey and balance sheet information from 7699 manufacturing firms (with 10 
employees and above) for six EU countries, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain, UK over 
the period 2001-2014 within a unified database.8 The EFIGE survey information is drawn from 
a questionnaire of 150 items covering six broad areas of firm economic activity: structure of 
the firm, workforce, innovation, internationalization, market structure and finance (Altomonte 
and Aquilante, 2012; Altomonte et al., 2013).9 Although the EFIGE survey was conducted in 
2008, the balance sheet information is available from 2001-2014. With reference to the 
questions of the EFIGE survey, three are important for our analysis. The first one is based on 
information regarding the ownership structure of the firm. The other two are related to 
information used to investigate firms’ characteristics that might be important for the realization 
of forward spillovers. Specifically, we use question D30A: Has the firm purchased raw 
                                                          
8 The initial EFIGE database includes 14579 firms. We exclude Austria and a substantial number of firms in other 
countries due to missing data in balance sheet variables that are needed for estimating the production function. 
The data clearing process reduced the number of firms to half.   
9 Some additional points regarding the EFIGE dataset are also in demand: (i) The final sample of firms is somehow 
biased towards large firms; (ii) The correlation of the sample in an array of variables (employees, revenue, wages) 
is very similar to firm level data set published by Eurostat (Structural Business Statistics for manufacturing firms 
with more than 10 employees). 
7 
 
materials or any intermediate goods for its domestic production in 2008? Based on the 
responses, we define a binary variable receiving ones if the firm has purchased materials or 
goods from a foreign firm and zero otherwise. The second variable is based on question D36: 
Has the firm purchased any intermediate goods? The possible answers are, raw materials, 
standardized intermediates and customized intermediaries. We define a binary variable on 
whether firms have purchased customized intermediaries.  
 
 
2.2 Definitions of Ownership and measures of TFP 
Information for MNE ownership is drawn from EFIGE based on the share of capital of 
the first shareholder.10 We define ownership by the fraction of capital shares owned by the first 
shareholder in 2008. We use three alternative definitions of foreign ownership: MNE10 
includes firms in which the first shareholder is of foreign nationality and owns at least 10% but 
less than 50% of the capital shares; MNE50 definition includes firms in which the first 
shareholder is of foreign nationality and owns at least 50% but less than 100% of the capital 
shares; MNE100 includes firms in which the shareholder is of foreign nationality and owns 
100% of the capital shares. Domestic firms are those whose 100% of the capital shares are 
owned by domestic shareholders.11Therefore, each of the three definitions of foreign ownership 
includes a different group of foreign firms. The MNE10 uses as foreign ownership threshold 
the standard lower bound of 10% commonly used in the literature, nonetheless it excludes firms 
in which the foreign affiliate owns the majority of the full amount of shares. MNE50 and 
MNE100 definitions capture tighter control of the foreign affiliate from its parental, which 
might also embody different motives in the decision of technology transfer (Guadalupe et al., 
2012; Girma et al., 2019). As information for MNE ownership is drawn from a single year (i.e. 
2008), it is implied that the number of foreign firms across different definitions of foreignness 
as well as the number of domestic firms do not change over time.12 Table 1 summarises the 
number of MNEs across different definitions of foreignness by country. After dropping firms 
                                                          
10 The EFIGE ownership data refer to the largest three shareholders allowing us to follow a direct ownership chain 
(UNCTAD, 2016). The owner can be of any legalistic form: Individual, Industrial Firm, Holding firm, Public 
Entity, Bank or Insurance Company.  
11 We do not include domestic MNEs to maintain a sample of purely domestic firms. 
12 It is a common practice to use information from a single year to define ownership in a panel context (Konnings, 
2001; Navaretti et al., 2014; Navaretti et al., 2019). This might induce some measurement bias if there are 
substantial alterations in the structure of capital shares before and after 2008. This type of measurement bias and 
unobserved endogeneity is more systematically treated in section 4.  
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due to missing data, the share of all foreign firms in the sample regardless the definition of 
ownership is close to 23%,13 similar to those reported in Girma et al.(2019),  Javorcik and 
Spatareanu (2011) Karpaty and Lundberg (2004).14  
  
    [Insert Table 1] 
 
We estimate TFP using the semi-parametric technique of Ackerberg et al., (2015). 
Accordingly, this procedure allows for a dynamic specification in the selection of the inputs of 
capital and labour. Contrary to the previous semi-parametric techniques of Olley and Pakes 
(1996) and Levisohn and Petrin (2003), Ackerberg et al., (2015) assume that labour and capital 
are both quasi-fixed inputs that are partially dependent on productivity. Appendix A1 outlines 
the key steps of the Ackerberg et al., (2015) methodology. Furthermore, the TFP derived from 
Ackerberg et al. (2015) represents essentially revenue TFP (TFPR), which combines influences 
from technical change and prices. We need to deflate TFPR in order to obtain a measure of 
physical productivity (TFPQ) (De Loecker et al. 2016) that will help us to understand the true 
effect of knowledge spillovers on productivity of domestic firms. In absence of price data 
deflators, we use an alternative methodology to isolate TFPQ from TFPR. We explain this 
methodology in detail in Appendix A5. All measures presented throughout the paper refer to 
TFPQ. 











                                                          
13 EFIGE data set is by construction biased toward large firms (Altomonte & Aquilante, 2012; Navaretti et al., 
2014) that are more likely to be MNEs.  
14 In Girma et al. (2019), the proportion of foreign firms in Chinese data is 21.1%, in Javorcik and Spatareanu, 
(2011) the share in Romanian data is 19.5% and in Karpaty and Lundberg (2004) the share of foreign firms in 
Swedish data is 17.1%. 
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2.3 Market Share and TFP Spillovers 
 
We now proceed with the measurement of variables that capture MS effects and AG from 
MNEs. We first define the MS variable, which is associated with the presence of MNEs in the 
same industry. We also define indices of horizontal spillovers derived from MNEs within the 
same industry and vertical spillovers, in the form of either forward spillovers from MNEs in 
upstream industries or backward spillovers from MNEs in downstream industries. 













  (1) 
where s is the ratio of sales revenue S of MNEs F to total sales revenue of all firms i in industry 
j (3-digit NACE Rev2)  at year t (country index c is supressed for readability). This index is 
similar to the variable that is commonly used in the literature to capture horizontal spillovers  
(Javorcik, 2004; Ha and Giroud, 2015; Newman et al.,2015;  Lu et al.,2017; Fons-Rosen et al., 
2017). 15  Nonetheless, in our econometric framework, sFjt will account for the level of 
competition pressure induced by MNEs within the same industry. In this case, higher levels of 
sFjt are expected to make domestic firms charge a lower price mark-up.   
Turing to AG indices, we differentiate our approach from the standard norm in the 
literature by using TFP adjusted spillover indices that embody information about the evolution 
of technical change in MNEs. To capture horizontal spillovers, we use the sum of TFP adjusted 







=∑   (2) 
where s is the market share as defined in (1) and FjtTFP  is the TFP of MNE F in industry j at 
year t. The value of Hjt increases either because MNEs increase their share of sales in industry 
j or because MNEs experience a higher level of technical progress.  
Vertical spillovers can be either backward or forward. Vertical Forward (VF) spillovers 
are derived from MNEs located in upstream industries that supply inputs to domestic firms. VF 
are defined as: 
    
1J




=∑ γ      (3) 
                                                          
15 The variables used to measure the FDI presence in the domestic country vary from gross output (Javorcik, 
2004; Yu et al, 2017) to R&D expenditures (Ha and Giroud, 2015).  
10 
 
Where jhγ is the input-output matrix coefficient that captures the amount of intermediate output 
purchased from upstream industry h in order to produce one unit of output in industry j at year 
t. htH is a measure of TFP adjusted horizontal spillovers in the upstream industry.  Analogously, 
vertical backward (VB) spillovers are derived from MNEs located in downstream industries 








=∑ γ   (4) 
Where jwγ is the input-output matrix coefficient that captures the amount of intermediate 
output purchased from industry j in order to produce one unit of output in the downstream 
industry w. Coefficients jhγ  and jwγ  are time invariant parameters that represent US input-
output coefficients across 4-digit SIC industries for the base year of 1992 (Alfaro et al., 2019).16 
As the key goal of the paper is to uncover whether the size of knowledge transfer varies with 
the degree of foreign ownership, we calculate indices (1) to (4) for each one of the definitions 












   
                                                          
16 The industrial classification in the EFIGE dataset follows NACE Rev2. Therefore, we had to convert the input-
output coefficients from SIC-US, which is the classification pattern in Alfaro et al. (2019) into NACE Rev2. This 
procedure was implemented in two steps. First, we match codes between SIC-US and ISIC Rev4 and then we 
converted industry codes from ISIC Rev4 to NACE Rev2. At the end, we map the 4-digit NACE Rev2 industries 
into their 3 digit pattern to fit the EFIGE industrial classification. An alternative less laborious strategy is to use 
directly the Leontief input-output matrices from OECD (Input-Output database). The main shortcoming of this 
method is that OECD input-output matrices are provided at an aggregated 2-digit level, thus less accurate for 
capturing inter-industry linkages at the 3-digit level.  
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3. Estimation Strategy and Results 
3.1 Econometric Specification 
 
To search for MS effects on the pricing behaviour of domestic firms, we use an econometric 
specification with the natural log of price mark-up μ of domestic firms as the dependent 
variable: 17   
 
0 1 1 2 1 1ln ' 'x α z α
F
ijt jt jt ijt x ij z c j t ijtμ α α s α CR θ η ν u− − −= + + + + + + + +   (5) 
 
i indexes domestic firms, j indexes 3-digit NACE Rev 2 industries, and t stands for time. The 
variable of interest, Fjts , measures the market share of MNEs in industry j. This regression 
framework allows us to relate FDI competition effects with price mark-ups of domestic firms. 
In this sense, parameter α1 captures the premium of higher FDI presence in industry j. CR is 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index that measures market concentration in industry j. Recent 
literature points out that mark-up heterogeneity is driven by a number of firm specific factors 
such as productivity and product differentiation. Productivity represents technical efficiency 
that might pick up additional variation in the pricing behaviour (Katayama et al., 2009; De 
Loecker, 2011; Edmond et al.,2015),18 so lnTFP of domestic firms is also included in vector x. 
We also control for a firm’s scope to invest in product differentiation, which enhances the 
ability of a higher mark-up (Hornok and Muraközy, 2019). Other time variant and firm specific 
controls included in vector x are the leverage ratio (LEV), defined as total liabilities over total 
assets and the intangibles ratio (INTA) defined as the share of fixed intangible assets over total 
fixed assets. Leverage ratio represents firm’s tendency to use external finance for product 
investment; similarly, intangibles ratio shows firms ability to improve product characteristics. 
Both controls are associated with product differentiation, which potentially rotates demand 
curve outwards making producers to face a less elastic demand thus charging a higher mark-
up. Finally, specification (5) includes a vector z of time invariant firm characteristics: a size 
dummy (SME) taking the value of 1 if i is a small-medium sized firm and zero otherwise,19 an 
age dummy (AGE) taking the value of 1 if firm i was established after 1995 and zero otherwise 
                                                          
17 We adopt the De-Loecker and Warzynski (2012) methodology for the derivation of μ. A brief illustration of 
this methodology is shown in Appendix Α5.  
18 See Restuccia and Regerson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009) for some novel work on the link between 
TFP and the misallocation of resources. 
19 A firm is defined as SME if the number of employees is between 50 and 249, (OECD, 2005).  
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and an export dummy (EXP) taking the value of 1 if i reports export sales in all years of the 
sample and zero otherwise. Vectors αx and αz include parameters to be estimated for firm 
specific, time variant and time invariant characteristics. The econometric specification is also 
augmented with country (θc), industry (𝜂𝜂j) and time fixed effects (𝜈𝜈t). Finally, uijt is the error 
term of the regression. The time variant variables of the right-hand side (Rhs) in (5) enter the 
regressions in one year lag so they can be considered as predetermined.  
 Turning to the investigation of AG on productivity of domestic firms, the dependent 
variable in specification (6) is the natural log TFP of domestic firms:   
0 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1
1
ln +
+ 'x β z β
ijt jt jt jt jt
ijt x ij z c j t ijt
TFP β β H β VF β VB β CR
θ η ν e
− − − −
−
= + + + +
′+ + + + +
   (6) 
Hjt-1 , VFjt-1 and VBjt-1  are the variables of interest that measure horizontal, forward and 
backward spillovers, respectively. The rest of variables in (6) are already defined and discussed 
above. The Rhs variables in (6) are also in one year lag. The use of predetermined variables is 




E Rhs e− =[ , ]  and accounts also for some delay in the impact of MNEs on domestic TFP. 




E Rhs e + ≠[ , ] or if there are omitted factors in the Rhs that matter for TFP in equation (6). 

















3.2 Results from Benchmark Specifications  
3.2.1 Market Share Effects 
 
Table 2 shows regression estimates of specification (5) for each definition of foreign ownership. 
Heteroscedasticity is a matter of particular concern in our econometric model, as our dataset 
consists of observations of firms that vary across countries and industries. To mitigate this issue, 
we apply a Generalised Least Squared (GLS) estimator. The coefficients reported in Table 2 
can be interpreted as semi-elasticities as mark-ups are expressed in natural logs with the 
majority of the Rhs variables to be ratios unless stated otherwise. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the country and industry level. As there is time dimension in our 
panel, we also allow for first order serial correlation in the uijt.  
 
     [Insert Table 2] 
 
 
We first observe that coefficient estimates for sjt-1 are negative and statistically 
significant at the five and ten percent confidence level and they do not vary substantially across 
different definitions of foreign ownership. This suggests the enhancement of competition is 
due to higher shares of MNEs in domestic industries. The economic size of this effect remains 
modest, as a 10 percent increase in the market share sjt-1 of wholly owned MNEs (column 3) 
leads domestic firms to charge on average a 2.1% lower price mark-up. Given that the effect 
of MNEs on mark-ups of domestic firms is robust across different definitions of foreign 
ownership, we can conclude that the MS effect from FDI generates some positive welfare gains 
for the domestic economy (especially in terms of consumer surplus), albeit the size of these 
competition gains is economically low.20 The coefficient estimate of the other industry specific 
variable in Table 2, CRjt-1 suggest that highly concentrated industries reap monopolistic power 
that leads to higher mark-ups. Interestingly, lnTFPijt exerts a negative effect on price mark-ups. 
The latter finding means that productivity gains resulting from a more efficient allocation of 
the production resources favour a competitive pricing behaviour.21 More importantly, with 
                                                          
20 In the meta-analysis study of Havranek and Irsova (2013), a coefficient of an FDI related spillover lower than 
0.1 is considered as economically unimportant despite being statistically significant.  
21 Admittedly, the relationship between lnμ and lnTFP might be subject to feedback effects, so the respective 
estimates can be misleading due to sizeable endogeneity bias. We do not consider this as a central issue to our 
research as our main objective in specification (5) is to unveil whether there are MS effects related to MNEs after 
controlling for all possible covariates. To the best of our knowledge, a specification that directly evaluates the 
MNEs’ effect on price mark-ups of domestic firms has not been done previously.   
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reference to our main research question, MNEs induced competition gains capture some 
variation in the evolution of price mark-ups of domestic firms even after controlling for 
productivity. Firms with high degree of leverage (LEV) tends to charge higher prices. This 
result could likely reflect that external borrowing is a channel of investment for product quality 
improvements (i.e. purchase of better quality inputs) that potentially leads to a higher price 
mark-ups (Konnings et al., 2005). An intensive use of intangibles assets (INTA) is also 
associated with higher mark-ups signifying that firms shape competitive advantage on the basis 
of product differentiation that justify higher mark-ups. Product quality as a factor of within 
industry mark-up heterogeneity is also highlighted in Kugler and Verhoogen (2012). SMEs 
charge lower mark-ups than large firms while the opposite is true for young firms (AGE), 
suggesting that competitive pricing behaviour is analogous to the age of the firm. We interpret 
this as a pure age effect that reflects efficiency gains from learning and accumulation 
experience. Finally, domestic exporters (EXP) charge lower mark-ups, a finding that echoes 
prior theoretical work on the positive role of export orientation in pricing behaviour (Bernard 
et al., 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). Accordingly, trade integration stimulates competition 
among international producers, which also feedbacks into the structure of the domestic market 
with exporters to charge overall lower prices.22 Finally, producers adjust their price mark-ups 
downwards the years of the global financial crisis, as shown by the coefficients dummies of 
2008 -2009.  
 
 
3.2.2 Agglomeration Gains 
 
Turning to the estimation of AG in Table 3, the variables of interest are Hjt-1, VFjt-1 and 
VBjt-1. To provide a basis of comparison with findings in the FDI spillovers literature, we first 
use a set of baseline specifications with spillover variables not adjusted for TFP that are 
identical to indices used in Javorcik (2004) and  Newman et al.(2015), among others. The non-
adjusted TFP index of horizontal spillovers accounts only for the sales share of MNE 
subsidiaries’ in each industry like index (1) (VFjt and VBjt are defined analogously).  
The coefficient of non-adjusted Hjt-1 in Panel A (Table 3) is statistically insignificant in 
all definitions of foreign ownership. Coefficient estimates of forward spillovers VFjt-1 from 
                                                          
22 Our results oppose those of De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) and Zhang and Zhu (2017) showing that 




upstream industries are significantly negative, while backward spillovers VBjt-1 from 
downstream industries are positive and statistically significant. The coefficient of VBjt-1 is 
0.188, which is relatively smaller than the average value of 0.307 for backward spillovers in 
firm level studies (Havranek and Irsova, 2011). Given that the dependent variable is lnTFPijt, 
the point estimate of  𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝚥𝚥𝚥𝚥−1�  under MNE100 can be interpreted as semi-elasticity, accordingly 
a 10% percent increase in the market share of MNEs in downstream industries increases TFP 
of domestic firms by 1.88%.23 Nonetheless, negative forward spillovers (VFjt-1) from MNE 
suppliers in upstream industries are negative with the point estimate of  𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝚥𝚥𝚥𝚥−1� to indicate that 
a 10% increase in the market share of wholly owned MNEs in upstream industries decrease 
domestic TFP by 1.45%. Note, the average effect from forward spillovers in the literature is 
close to 0.7% (Havranek and Irsova, 2011). The net effect from vertical spillovers 
1 1( )jt jtVF VB− −+ remains positive within the range of 0.16% and 0.46%. The negative coefficient 
of VFjt-1 is a result that merits additional investigation in the upcoming section.       
 Turning to Panel B (Table 3) with TFP adjusted spillovers24 (definitions in (2), (3) and 
(4)), horizontal spillovers are detected from majority (MNE50) and wholly owned (MNE100) 
MNE subsidiaries. Indicatively, a 10% increase in the presence of wholly owned MNEs 
increases TFP of domestic firms within the same industry by 0.21%.25 The size of TFP adjusted 
horizontal spillovers is smaller than VBjt-1 in Panel B and still below the one percent threshold 
defined as a rule of thumb for the realisation of reasonably meaningful economic gains from 
FDI spillovers (Havranek and Irsova, 2013). In sum, horizontal spillovers of low economic 
significance are detected under the strict definitions of foreign ownership (MNE50 and 
MNE100) and only if MNEs’ sales share is adjusted for TFP. This is preliminary evidence that 
horizontal spillovers depend on the ownership structure of MNEs as the latter determines 
motives and prospects of knowledge transfer from the parental to the MNE subsidiary. It bears 
noting that estimates of Table 3 are not driven by differences in sample sizes as the number of 
domestic firms remains the same regardless the definition of the foreign firm.   
                                                          
23 The size of backward spillovers in the literature varies with the level of development of the economy under 
study. Although the average value in the meta-analysis of Havranek and Irsova (2011) is 0.307 this coefficient 
might vary substantially. For example, the coefficient of backward spillovers for Chinese firms is 0.54 (Lu et al., 
2017), 0.43 for Vietnamese firms (Newman et al.2015), 0.087 for Indonesian firms (Blalock and Gertler, 2008) 
and between 0.03 and 0.07 for Lithuanian firms (Javorcik, 2004). The present point estimate for EU countries 
indicates remarkable TFP gains from linkages with MNEs in downstream industries that sometimes exceed gains 
realised in developing and emerging markets.   
24 As mentioned, the measure of TFP adjusted is more informative about the evolution of technical change in 
foreign firms and the potential of technology transfer from MNEs to domestic counterparts. 
25 Havranek and Irsova (2013) consider as economically significant effects from horizontal spillover that exceed 
0.1. According to this definition, our coefficient of Hjt-1 in Panel B is negligible despite its statistical significance.  
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Coefficient estimates of vertical forward and backward spillovers (VFjt-1 and VBjt-1) in 
Panel B are close to those reported in Panel A both in terms of magnitude and significance. 
The average net effect of TFP adjusted spillovers (Hjt-1+VFjt-1+VBjt-1) across all ownership 
structures is close to 0.03 indicating that a 10% increase in the presence of MNEs leads to a 
rise in the TFP of domestic firms’ by 0.3%. Overall, the size of AG is economically 
unimportant, a finding that is mainly driven from the negative impact of forward spillovers.  
 
    [Insert Table 3] 
 
Turning to coefficients of the other controls, the CRjt-1 index exerts a negative effect on 
TFP implying that market concentration is associated with insufficient competition among 
firms leading to a non-optimal use of the resources and, thus lower productivity. The coefficient 
of LEVijt-1 is also negative signifying that external funding is not always related to productivity 
enhancing investment.26The coefficient of INTAijt-1 is positive, with a 10% increase of in-house 
investment in intangible capital to lead to a 0.4% increase in TFP. Interestingly, the size of this 
effect is lower than the one exerted by VBjt-1, and slightly above than that of Hjt-1. Finally, 
domestic SMEs and exporters exhibit superior productivity performance than large firms and 
non-exporters, while newly established firms tend to have lower TFP, consistent with well-
established evidence on the impact of age, size and exporting on firm performance (Majumdar, 
1997; Zhang and Zhu, 2017).    
 
3.3 Further Specifications  
3.3.1 Horizontal Spillovers and Absorptive Capacity 
 
Estimates of previous section illustrate that horizontal spillovers, Hjt-1 are not detected under 
the MNE10 definition of foreign ownership. Likewise, under stricter definitions of foreign 
ownership, their economic magnitude, while statistically significant, is low. Another striking 
finding that emerged in the previous section is the negative coefficient of forward spillovers 
VFjt-1. To further elaborate on these results, we first link the existence of horizontal spillovers 
to absorptive capacity of individual firms. The rationale behind this exploration is that benefits 
from intra-industry knowledge spillovers might be analogous to the degree of technological 
                                                          
26 We also experiment with a quadratic term of leverage as in Coricelli et al. (2012) to unveil any non-linear 
effects. However, we do not find any significant relationship between TFP and the squared term of leverage 
(results are available upon request). 
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similarity between domestic firms and foreign subsidiaries. Keller and Yeaple (2009), Javorcik 
and Spatareanu (2008), Havranek and Irsova (2013) and Bloom et al., (2013) claim that 
horizontal spillovers are largely driven by the technological profile of the industry27 and on the 
degree of technological closeness between domestic firms and MNEs. 28  In other words, 
horizontal spillovers are triggered with the ability of domestic firms to absorb knowledge from 
entities that are more technologically advanced. We account for absorptive capacity using 
intangible assets that represent the in-house effort of domestic firms to build a critical mass of 
technological expertise. Empirically, we augment (6) with an interaction term between 
intangible capital INTAijt-1 and Hjt-1 to test the hypothesis that the horizontal spillovers increase 
with the level of in-house investment in intangible capital of domestic firms. 
      
[Insert Table 4] 
 
 
Table 4 shows that the linear term of  Hjt-1 remains statistically insignificant, similarly 
the autonomous impact of  INTAijt-1 is also low, 0.05. However, the coefficient of the interaction 
term Hjt-1×INTAit-1 is positive and statistically significant, even at the low threshold of foreign 
ownership, MNE10. To calculate the semi-elasticity of Hjt-1 from the composite effect of 
absorptive capacity, we differentiate lnTFPijt with respect to Hjt-1. From specification (3) in 
Table 4, we derive an effect of horizontal spillovers that is equal to 2.57.29 This indicates 
substantial productivity gains both in statistical and economic terms. Precisely, a 10 percent 
increase in the presence of MNEs in the same industry combined with in-house intangible 
capital leads to a 25.7% rise in TFP of domestic firms. Coefficients of forward VFjt-1 and 
backward spillovers VBjt-1 remain practically unchanged (negative and positive, respectively) 
albeit slightly lower in absolute terms compared to estimates in Table 3. The finding that 
horizontal spillovers are conditional on the level of in-house investment in intangible capital 
accords well with a stylised fact of the productivity convergence literature (Griffith et al., 2004) 
that stresses the dual role of internal investment in innovation. That is, investment in intangible 
                                                          
27 The term technological profile here indicates industry’s own efforts to devote resources for innovation. 
28 Another strand of the existing literature links spillovers to the strategy of MNE subsidiaries (Ha and Giroud, 
2015). Accordingly, the type of innovation activity from MNEs determines the scope of productivity gains for 
local firms. Evidence from South Korean firms shows that competence–creating MNEs rather than competence-
exploiting MNEs are those that generate substantial horizontal and vertical spillovers. 
29 The composite effect from horizontal spillovers is: 1 1
1
ln ˆ ˆ 0.429ijt H H INTA ijt ijt
ijt
TFP





= + × = ×
∂
. 
Setting the statistically insignificant coefficient ˆ
Hβ  equal to zero and evaluating INTAijt-1 in its sample mean, we 
obtain the value of 2.57. 
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capital increases the internal technological capabilities of the firm, while it also eases the 
adoption of technological advancements already in use somewhere else.  
 
3.3.2 Vertical Forward Spillovers: The Role of Direct linkages and Customized 
Inputs 
 
Next, we elaborate on the negative value of forward spillovers, VFjt-1, reported in Table 
3. The spillover variable defined in (3) is based on an input-output coefficient that measures 
the amount that industry j consumes from the output of upstream industry h. However, it does 
not account for any specific relationship between domestic firm i and MNE F supplier in the 
upstream industry. This might be a serious omission that does not take into account structural 
characteristics of domestic firms in downstream sectors. The firm-level characteristic that is of 
particular importance here is the scope of product differentiation and the role of direct contacts 
with MNE suppliers that provide technologically advanced inputs of higher quality (Grossman 
and Helpman, 1991). Forward spillovers benefit domestic firms that directly purchase 
intermediate inputs from foreign subsidiaries but also through imitation for domestic firms that 
do not maintain direct contacts with foreign suppliers (Newman et al, 2015). A necessary 
condition for the realization of forward spillovers might be the existence of a sufficient number 
of domestic firms that are supplied by MNEs in upstream sectors. Subsequently, forward 
spillovers could be an increasing function of the number of domestic firms that use MNEs as 
input suppliers. Subsequently, forward spillovers are an increasing function of the number of 
domestic firms with MNEs as input suppliers. Furthermore, the purchase of technologically 
advanced inputs from MNE subsidiaries indicates that domestic firms have a substantial scope 
for product differentiation (Andresson et al. 2002). Domestic firms that attempt to differentiate 
the attributes of their products purchase customized inputs tailored to specific needs. 
Customized inputs are technologically intensive, while their use is systematically associated 
with a strategic tendency to upgrade product characteristics (Caselli, 2018). Overall, the use of 
customized inputs as a channel of product differentiation enhances productivity through the 
amount of tacit knowledge embodied in these inputs (Bas and Strauss-Khan, 2014; Bournakis 
et al., 2018). To sum up previous discussion, forward spillovers can be positive under two 
conditions: first, there are sufficient domestic firms in the downstream industry that use MNE 
subsidiaries in upstream sectors as suppliers and second, there are sufficient domestic firms 
that purchase intermediate inputs customized to specific product characteristics. Accordingly, 



















=∑ ∑ γ    with i ϵ j   (7.2) 
 
where nd is the number of firms in industry j that directly purchase goods or intermediate inputs 
from foreign subsidiaries in upstream sectors and nq is the number of firms in industry j that 
use customized intermediate inputs. We re-estimate specification (6) with modified vertical 
spillovers of (7.1) and (7.2) as explanatory variables. Coefficient estimates of both MVF indices 
are positive and statistically significant (Table 5). In columns 1-3, coefficients MVFdjt-1 and 
VBjt-1 are in the range of 0.1 to 0.134%. In estimates of columns 4-6 they are slightly lower, 
albeit statistically significant at conventional levels. Such coefficient estimates indicate the 
importance of product differentiation and business ties with MNEs suppliers, which can make 
the size of forward spillovers (0.134 in wholly owned MNEs) twice as much as the average 
size found in the literature (Havranek and Irsova, 2011).   
 
 






3.3.3 Regional versus Non-Regional Spillovers 
 
In this sub-section, we perform a final test for the exploration of horizontal spillovers by 
focusing on their spatial element and the potential of agglomeration knowledge spillovers in 
geographically concentrated areas. Geographical proximity allows for higher levels of labour 
mobility as well as it stimulates knowledge transfer via face-to-face communication of 
managers (Halpern and Muraközy, 2007; Xu and Sheng, 2012). Another stream of the literature 
of economic geography suggests that knowledge externalities are transmitted more effectively 
within small distances (Crespo et al., 2009). However, adverse competition effects are also 
possible in areas where domestic firms are geographically closed to MNEs. Nevertheless, in 
highly integrated product markets competition effects are expected to be independent from 
geographical distance with knowledge spillovers to dominate (Taylor and Taylor, 2004). We 
scrutinize empirically this hypothesis by constructing regionally based horizontal spillovers. 
We decompose the index of Horizontal spillovers in equation (2) into a regional and a non-
regional part. The component of regional horizontal spillovers (RH) from MNEs located within 
the same NUTS2 regions is:  
 
,jt Fjkt FjktF j k
RH s TFP
∈
=∑   (8)  













.This is the share of sales of 
all MNEs F in industry j in region k to total sales in industry j in region k (country index is 
again suppressed for readability). As index (2) is the sum of regional and non-regional 
horizontal spillovers in industry j, the non-regional component of horizontal spillovers ( jtNRH ) 
is: jt jt jtNRH H RH≡ − . Table 6 reports estimates of specification (6) that encompasses 
regional horizontal spillovers (RH) and non-regional horizontal spillovers (NRH) interacted 
with INTA. The coefficients of RHjt-1 and NRH jt-1 are insignificant in all definitions of foreign 
ownership. Interestingly, the highest in magnitude spillover effect arises from the interaction 
term of RHjt-1×INTAijt-1 under the MNE10 definition of foreign ownership. We calculate the 
semi-elasticity of RHjt-1 as: 1
1








= + × =
∂
 Accordingly, a 10% 
increase in regional horizontal spillovers increases TFP of domestic firms located within the 
same region by 61.2%. In MNE50 and MNE100 definitions, horizontal spillovers are also 
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economically significant. The relatively higher elasticity of RH in MNE10 definition indicates 
that collaborative projects between domestic firms and MNE subsidiaries is an important 
source of productivity gains for purely domestic firms that are located nearby. Our results 
suggest that the elimination of geographical proximity combined with absorptive capacity 
makes domestic firms instantly more receptive to the advanced technological know-how of 
foreign firms (Ju et al., 2013; Cheung and Ping, 2004).   
 
[Insert Table 6]  
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3.4 Evaluating Knowledge Agglomeration Gains: Further Considerations 
 
Table 7 shows the size of AG (the sum of elasticities) under the different determinants 
as presented throughout the paper. First, the economic value of AG without controlling for any 
other condition remains economically insignificant (despite statistical significance) and lower 
than 0.1. Accordingly, a 10% increase in wholly owned MNEs in the host economy (same 
industry, upstream and downstream industries) does not increase TFP of domestic firms more 
than 0.63% the maximum. The degree of ownership matters for horizontal spillovers. Contrary 
to recent evidence (Abraham et al. 2010; Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008) that domestic firms 
learn easier from foreign firms if there are joint ventures of foreign firms and other domestic 
firms, we show that the wholly owned MNEs subsidiaries generate more significant horizontal 
spillovers at least in statistical terms. Our findings about horizontal spillovers are consistent 
with McCaughey et al. (2018) that also examine a large sample of EU firms. The greater size 
of horizontal spillovers from wholly owned MNE subsidiaries is associated with how 
subsidiaries respond to the liability of foreignness. Parental firms not only transfer important 
proprietary assets to the subsidiary but also majority and wholly owned subsidiaries are more 
likely to be “competence-creating” rather “competence-exploiting” subsidiaries (Ha and 
Giroud, 2015). To defend and maintain competence MNEs need to source from domestic 
partners, which increases the potential of spillovers (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005; Narula, 
2014; Papanastassiou et al., 2019).  
We attribute the economically weak AG to the fact that EU firms are already closed to 
technological frontier with a small technological gap between domestic firms and MNES thus 
limited potential for knowledge spillovers. The latter are an increasing function of technology 
gap between domestic and foreign firms (Meyer and Sinani, 2009).  Economically important 
spillovers from MNEs can still flow if domestic firms have the appropriate level of absorptive 
capacity. The size of these gains for domestic TFP can be as close as to 26% after a 10 percent 
increase in the presence of wholly owned MNEs as shown in Table 7. The literature usually 
refers to absorptive capacity in terms of human capital (Narula and Marin, 2003), in our study 
substantial gains are generated from intangible capital. This finding essentially unveils 
differences in intangible capital intensity even among developed countries. Indicatively, France 
has the highest ratio of intangible capital 7% in our sample, while UK firms spend on average 
2.1%. Insufficient investment in factors driving innovation is regarded a key reason for the  UK 
productivity slowdown in the last fifteen years (Bournakis and Mallick, 2018).  
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The size of backward spillovers is economically meaningful without accounting for any 
other condition. This highlights that foreign subsidiaries have already developed strong ties 
with local supplies, more likely due to high technological similarity between domestic EU 
firms and MNEs. Local suppliers in EU countries can easily comply with the quality standards 
of investors, which increases the intensity of linkages thus greater potential for knowledge 
transfer. Finally, domestic firms demonstrate structural heterogeneity in terms of strategic 
orientation and motives that matter for forward spillovers. The latter become significant if 
domestic firms use directly foreign firms as suppliers but to do so they must also have a scope 
for product differentiation and need of customized inputs.  






4. Identification Strategy to address Endogeneity and Measurement Bias 
4.1 FDI Restrictiveness and Changes in the EU Services Policy Regime  
 
Estimates reported in Tables 2-6 search for horizontal and vertical FDI spillovers controlling 
for absorptive capacity, firm characteristics and geographical proximity. Nonetheless, results 
might be biased due to unobserved reverse causality between domestic TFP and spillover 
indices, Hjt, VFjt and VBjt. Location decisions of MNEs’ are usually driven by characteristics 
of host markets. For example, MNEs select locations where domestic firms are highly 
productive, skilled labor abundant, while there consumer and supplier networks are also well-
established. Another source of bias in estimating equation (6) emerges from omitted variables 
that are jointly related to TFP and spillovers. The standard approach for addressing endogeneity 
bias in (6) is to use an Instrumental Variable (IV) estimator. In firm level studies, the 
identification of valid firm specific instruments that will be correlated with the endogenous 
variables and uncorrelated with the error term is an extremely difficult task. Weak instruments 
in two stages least square estimations induces bias that in cases exceeds OLS bias (Murray, 
2006). In two stages least square and equivalently GMM estimators, the Wald test is also 
severely distorted due to weak instrumentation making hypothesis testing and statistical 
inference problematic (Bun and Windmeijer, 2010). The shortcomings existing in two stages 
least square estimations make imperative the use of an alternative methodology for mitigating 
endogeneity.  
To establish a causal relationship between spillovers and TFP of domestic firms, we 
first identify exogenous sources of variation that are associated with horizontal and vertical 
spillovers. In doing so, we rely on two pieces of information: a) the evolution of the FDI 
restrictiveness index and b) the timing of the European Union (EU) Services Liberalization 
Directive initiated in the end of 2006. These two regulatory policy changes are not plausibly 
caused by firm level TFP and could be used to identify MNEs’ spillovers.30After establishing 
correlation between the two exogenous instruments and spillover variables Hjt, VFjt, 
                                                          
30 We could not use these two factors as instruments in a 2SLS IV estimation as these two variables are only time 
variant across countries without firm or industry level variation. This feature makes them by default weak 
instruments in a 2SLS estimation inducing the problems of weak instrumentation already discussed above. 
Nonetheless, these two events are highly appropriate for the dif-in-dif approach that we have chosen to use instead.  
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,d qjt jtMVF MVF and VBjt, we examine if TFP of domestic firms increased in countries that relaxed 
FDI restrictions after the EU Services’ Liberalization Directive in 2006.31  
We first explore whether these two regulatory regime changes are related to horizontal 
and vertical spillovers. EU services liberalization and FDI restrictions determine a country’s 
profile as a destination for foreign investors. Accordingly, spillovers originating from MNEs 
are also driven by the timing of EU Services liberalization and the extent of restrictions on 
foreign investment. Appendix A9 shows the evolution of the FDI regulatory restrictions across 
the six countries of our sample. Hungary, Italy, Spain and UK relaxed their FDI restrictions 
straight after the introduction of the EU Services’ Liberalization Directive in 2006, while 
France and Germany did not implement any change after this year. 
To examine if FDI restrictions and liberalization of services affect spillovers, we 
introduce the following econometric specification:  
 
0 1 2jt t t c j t jctSPILL FDI T v= + + + + + +γ γ γ θ η ε ,  
with  { }, , , ,d qjt jt jt jt jtSpill H VF MVF MVF VB∈   (9) 
 
The dependent variable of equation (9) is the spillover (SPILL) index in country c (suppressed 
for readability), industry j in year t. We only consider spillovers from the MNE100 definition, 
which provide systematically the most statistically and economically higher coefficients in 
Table 3. FDI is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a relaxation in FDI restrictions took 
place in country c after 2006 and zero, otherwise. We include in (9) a time dummy T which 
receives ones from 2007 onwards, after the implementation of the EU Services Liberalization 
Directive. The time fixed effects 𝜈𝜈t are also included to capture among others the effect of the 
2007-2009 global financial crisis. Specification (9) is also augmented with industry 𝜂𝜂j and 
country fixed (𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐 ) effects. OLS estimates in Table 8 confirm a positive and statistically 
significant correlation between relaxation in FDI restrictions and spillover indices, SPILLjt. The 
effect of the time dummy T on spillover variables is less certain. It is positively associated with 
Hjt but negatively with VFjt, ,d qjt jtMVF MVF and VBjt.  
 
     [Insert Table 8] 
                                                          
31 The implementation of the EU Services’ directive was a long process with some countries (more reluctant to 




4.2 Difference in differences estimates 
 
Having demonstrated a strong relationship between spillovers and policy instruments, 
we use a difference in differences (dif-in-dif) specification to examine if there is a causal effect 
of spillovers on TFP of domestic firms. We compare TFP in the treatment group (firms in 
countries that relaxed FDI restrictions after the 2006 Services Liberalization Directive) with 
TFP in the control group (firms in countries that did not relax FDI restrictions after 2006). In 
other words, we observe pairs of firms and countries before and after the policy change. The 
control group, essentially, includes firms from France and Germany, the countries that did not 
relax FDI restrictions after 2006, while the treatment group includes firms from Italy, Spain, 
UK and Hungary. To compare TFP differences between firms of the two groups, we estimate 
the following dif-in-dif specification: 
 
0 1 2 3 4ln ( ) ( )ict ct ct ictTFP δ δ Q δ I T W δ Q I T W δ X= + + > + × > +   (10) 
 
Q is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if we observe a negative change in the FDI 
regulatory burden in country c and zero otherwise, I(T>W) is an indicator function equal to 1 
if the period is after the policy change (2007 onwards) and zero otherwise. 𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝚥𝚥 × 𝐼𝐼(𝑇𝑇 > 𝑊𝑊) is 
an interaction term that captures the impact of lower FDI restrictions on TFP after EU Services 
Liberalization. Parameter δ3 is the dif-in-dif estimate representing the TFP impact of lower 
restrictions on FDI after liberalization of EU Services. Vector X includes CRjt, LEVijt, INTAijt, 
SMEi, AGEi and Exporti that influence TFP either through their association with Q or I(T>W). 
Specification (10) includes industry, country and time fixed effects.32 
 
[Insert Table 9] 
 
The upper panel of Table 9 displays estimates of TFP for both treated and control firms 
before the liberalization of EU services in 2006. It also reports estimated TFP differences 
between the two groups along with their associated standard errors. The difference in TFP is 
negative and statistically significant meaning that firms in countries that did not relax FDI 
restrictions (France and Germany) achieved higher TFP vis-à-vis firms in countries that did 
(UK, Italy, Spain, Hungary). The lower panel of Table 9 reports estimates of TFP for treated 
                                                          
32 Coefficient estimates of covariates in X are not reported. 
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and control firms for the post-2006 EU Services Liberalization Directive. The difference in 
TFP between treated and control firms is also negative for the post 2006 period. The dif-in-dif 
estimate that represents the policy effect is 0.104 in Column 1. This finding suggests that, 
contrary to the control group, firms in countries that relaxed FDI restrictions achieved a 
relatively higher TFP after the announcement of the policy change. Our dif-in-dif specification 
also explores whether the policy effect varies across quantiles of the TFP distribution.  
Since the classification of firms into treatment and control groups is not random, 
unobserved factors might bias the estimation of the treatment effect. To reduce selection bias, 
we use propensity score matching based on specific characteristics that could determine 
selection into treatment and control groups. We match observations using CRjt, LEVijt, INTAijt, 
SMEi, AGEi and Exporti. The dif-in-dif estimate after matching observations remains positive 
in column 6 (Table 9) showing that firms in countries that relaxed FDI restrictions achieved 
higher TFP vis-à-vis those in counties that did not. The economic size of this effect (0.082) is 
also significant as it represents 12% of the average TFP score (0.682) of treated firms before 
the policy change. 
Finally, a long negotiating process among EU members was preceded the EU Services 
Liberalization in 2006. Policy effects in Table 8 might represent precautionary action of 
economic agents in anticipation of deregulation in EU Services. If policy effects were 
anticipated, then we are likely to obtain lower-bound estimates of the true effect partly because 
some effects occurred before actual policy implementation. The first political signal on the 
forthcoming EU services liberalization was given in early 2004 when the European 
Commission announced the Internal Market Services Directive. We use this as a cut-off year 
to compare TFP between treated and control firms in Table 10. We replicate estimates of Table 
9 based on the same set of control variables. Estimates of the first two columns confirm that 
even if liberalization had been anticipated, firm-level TFP in countries that relaxed FDI 
restrictions improved well before the official adoption of the EU Services Directive in 2006. 
The remaining estimates of Table 10 (columns 3-6) present placebo estimates based on 
a false timing of the liberalization of EU Services. Precisely, we consider 2003 (columns 3-4) 
and 2002 (columns 5-6) as wrong dates of FDI services liberalisation. The dif-in-dif estimates 
for both years are either insignificant (column 4) or negative (column 3). Gathering evidence 
from Table 10, there is no positive effect on TFP prior to the initial announcement of 2004, 
suggesting that any improvements in productivity took place only after the original 
announcement of liberalization in 2004. These sensitivity tests enhance further the reliability 








Overall, the sensitivity analysis in section 4 show that a considerable decrease of the 
TFP gap between control and treated firms emerged only after the introduction of the EU 
Services Liberalization Directive in 2006 in countries that actually relaxed FDI restrictions. As 
both EU Services Liberalization Directive and relaxation of FDI restrictions are significantly 
associated with spillover indices (Table 8), our estimates in Tables 3 to 6 are robust and fairly 








5. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, we revisit the puzzle regarding the role of MNEs spillovers on 
performance of domestic firms. We distinguish between market share effects and knowledge 
Agglomeration gains. Accordingly, we regress measures of foreign presence on mark-ups and 
TFP of domestic firms. We have derived a measure of physical TFP that separates changes of 
technological progress from price effects. Using a sample of manufacturing firms form six EU 
countries, we found that higher presence of MNEs decrease the mark-up charged by domestic 
firms. The value of the MS effect is close to two percent and signifies welfare gains for 
consumer of the host economy. We further investigated whether the value of knowledge 
spillovers from MNEs varies with the degree of foreign ownership. We found that under strict 
definitions of majority and full-foreign ownership the value of horizontal spillovers is higher. 
Nonetheless, the value of this effect remains economically negligible. When we control for 
absorptive capacity, in the form of intangible capital the economic size of horizontal spillovers 
increases considerably. Furthermore, domestic firms that are geographically close to MNE 
subsidiaries and invest in intangible capital can more easily benefit from knowledge spillovers. 
Backward spillovers from MNEs in downstream industries are also important, nonetheless 
forward spillovers from upstream industries are not straightforward. Our empirical analysis has 
shown that domestic firms benefit from the presence of MNEs in upstream industries only if 
they purchase inputs directly from they and they have substantial scope for product 
differentiation as reflected in the use of customised inputs. A key message from our analysis is 
that intangible capital in benefiting from MNE related spillovers is of prominent importance. 
A relevant policy recommendation derived from the analysis is that domestic firms should be 
provided with targeted incentives for boosting internal innovative capabilities as this will help 
them to develop more effective synergies and interactions with the technological capabilities 
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